Fresh for the Plucking?

If the Taliban were to launch an ambitious recruiting campaign across Afghanistan in the next few weeks, odds are they will find hundreds if not thousands of despairing young men who have been turned down by the handful institutions of higher learning in the country and face grim and unknown futures. These are members of the post-Taliban generation of high school graduates who have long dreamed of gaining a university education -as evidenced by their widespread participation in the university entry exams- and are suddenly finding out that those dreams are shattered -and all for no fault of theirs.

Afghanistan’s few universities are already operating above capacity, and now for another consecutive year university officials have had to turn down some 38,000 candidates who participated in the matriculation exams -a figure nearly double that of last year’s, and representing nearly two thirds of this year’s university hopefuls.

According to a BBC Persian report by journalist Dawood Naji from Kabul, as more and more students graduate from high schools across the country and a greater number of these decide to take part in the university entry exams, authorities will have to refuse entry to an ever increasing number of students. The report cites an estimate by Afghanistan’s Ministry of Higher Learning that in 10 years the number of university candidates will reach a million students per year while the capacity of Afghanistan’s universities will peak at merely 100,000 – only one in ten students will have the opporturnity to attend university. Already the issue is spoken of as “Afghanistan’s crisis of higher education.”

It is easy to foresee where all of this is headed for: The end of the Taliban era was marked by an explosion in primary school enrollments (approximately 4 million for each of the past two years.) As this boom generation reaches high school and later graduates, competition will worsen and universities will be overwhelmed. Just as investment in higher education will ensure a future generation of educated citizens and skilled workers for the country’s reconstruction, neglecting to address this mounting crisis will spawn hundreds of thousands of young people who are too educated and ambitious to settle for the traditional farming and labor employments, and too unprepared and unskilled to fill jobs in the public and private sectors that demand specific skills and a university degree – such a generation of ambitious discontents is sure to provide extremist and irredentist causes with fresh recruits thirsty for a certain future and a sense of meaning and belonging.

Let Us Go to Mazaar, O’ Mullah!

(photo by safrang)

It’s Nowrouz today: the vernal equinox, the first day of spring, the beginning of the solar calendar, and the occasion for one of the most syncretic of festivals in the world: a cheerful amalgamation of Islam and Zoroastrianism, pagan rite and religious ritual, red tulip and the holy book.

This spirit of joyful syncretism is captured best in one of the oldest folk tunes in Afghanistan- one that goes through everyone’s mind at this time of the year- where a certain good-natured and blithe Mullah is urged to come partake in the festivities of Nowrouz.

Because in recent times spring in Afghanistan has come to be associated with the thaw that brings on the “spring offensive”, and because the spirit of the joyful Mullah Mamad jan has long died in Afghanistan and is replaced with the haunting spectre of another Mullah, we take the liberty to modify the old tune and urge the latter Mullah to forget the offensive and join in the festive:

Let us go to Mazaar, Mullah Omar jan!

***

Correction:

(Thanks to Hatif’s comment admonishing me not to invite the Mullah to Mazaar -and by historic precedence I should know why that would be a terrible idea- I stand corrected. The line above was meant to imply:

Let the rest of us go to Mazaar, O’ Mullah!

Not that the mad Mullah is prepared to listen to either interpretation…)

Yes, Who the Hell Pays These People to Write?

Joshua Faust of the indomitable Registan asks “Who the hell pays these people to write?” in relation to a recent UPI commentary about Afghanistan. In a nod to Registan and all the serious blogging that goes on there on Afghanistan, and in furtherance to Joshua’s pet-peeves about the UPI commentary, I have decided to add a few of my own to the seemingly interminable list of factual and other infractions that the commentary perpetrates.

First, highlights from Registan about the commentary:

• Kabul has about 3.5 million, not 2 million residents. Most live in unregistered housing built outside government control. Also, Iran helped us invade and topple the Taliban—it’s natural for them to maintain a presence there.
• I guess people don’t fear American bombers anymore, despite the random mis-targeting that has recently killed entire families.
• I guess, despite all published economic data to the contrary, the opium economy is 2/3 of Afghanistan’s total economy, not the 1/3 commonly cited by the national government, IFIs, and NATO.
• “An estimated $8 billion a year is needed to dig Afghanistan out of its narco-state status. But the funds aren’t available.” So, did President Bush not just pledge $8.6 billion in aid this year?
• “The Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan throughout the 1990s and killed thousands of Afghans in a vain attempt to establish its dominion.” Wrong decade, wrong numbers (approximately one millions Afghans died during the invasion, most from Soviet/Najibullah massacres).
• We should send aid through hawala, even though in the following sentence the author says, “it wouldn’t take long to co-opt or silence government hawala circuits.” What?

Committing any of these mistakes would warrant next-day corrections and possibly a rebuke of the writer. That the piece contains so many of them (and that is just the beginning of it) is a testament on how subsidizing papers with a view to making them mouthpieces for a certain agenda is a bad idea.

To answer Joshua’s question about who the hell pays these people – well, let’s just say that the paper’s backers tend to view themselves closer to the opposite heavenly abode, i.e. heaven. UPI is owned by New World Communications, which is in turn owned by the Unification Church. Over the years, Reverand Moon who heads the Unification Church has subsidized the Washington Times, the flagship publication of New World Communications at a loss of approximately $1 billion. He has declared: “The Washington Times will become the instrument in spreading the truth about God to the world.”

Back to the commentary, published twice, first under the title Afghanistan’s Opium Tango March 14th on UPI, and later under Broken Afghan Consensus March 17th, Washtington Times. Add to the list of error’s cited by Registan the following:

• The writer claims “The Shia suburbs of Kabul are now under the control of Iranian or pro-Iranian agents.“ This is an outrageous claim. While it is true that Iran has been attempting to make inroads among Afghanistan’s Shi’a community (largely the Hazara) to claim that their agents “control” suburbs of Kabul is stretching the truth. If anything, new political leadership among the Hazara are generaly suspicious of Iranian support. The Hazara association with Iran in the chaotic decade of 1990s, while low on substantial material/political support, was high on rhetoric and revolutionary spirit. This brought the Hazara widespread rebuke and isolation and the label of “Iranian agents” while in reality it did little to improve their lot. More importantly, there has been a substantial change in how Iran channels its support in Afghanistan. Instead of the initial “Shi’a solidarity” model, it is increasingly chosing to patronize groups along ethno-linguistic and cultural affinity lines. This is why Iran’s presence is far more visible in western Afghanistan and in particular in and around the city of Herat than in central Afghanistan and the Hazarajat.
• “The U.S. is hoping to diversify Afghanistan’s regional relationships by coaxing Gulf states to become stakeholders;” I suppose the writer means to wean Afghanistan off reliance on neighboring countries, but what is this going to accomplish? I seriously doubt if the US is pursuing such a policy. Instead, I think people are far more worried about managing current relationships vis-a-vis Pakistan and other regional neighbors. Diversifying regional relationships suggests that Pakistan is somehow dispensible in the process – which is simply not true. And it is not like Afghanistan has no bilateral relations with the “Gulfies” and is relying on the US to mend those ties. It is just that the Gulf States are not as crucial and as involved in Afghanistan as its immediate neighbors are. At any rate, the language here seems reminiscent of mutual funds lingo and Wall Street talk than international relations.
• “And today’s Afghanistan is totally insecure, so much so that it has already been promoted to the ranks of failed states…” We assume the author is referring to the annual Failed States Index compiled by Foreign Policy magazine and Fund for Peace. I don’t remember Afghanistan ever being off the list for it now to be “promoted to the ranks” as the commentary says. And anyways, no country is off the list: besides Afghanistan and Sudan, both the US and Norway are on the list too. Technically, all countries are on the “ranks of failed states”, what is important is their position on that list. If anything, inthe most recent ranking Afghanistan enjoyed a better position than before (to the outrage of Pakistan whose ranking was higher than that of Afghanistan), so if anything, Afghanistan was demoted on the ranking.
  
• “…except for an all-pervasive opium culture that keeps Afghanistan from sinking into total chaos.” An “all-pervasive opium culture” saving the day in Afghanistan- enough said. And “opium culture” sounds just too intriguing to not wonder what the author exactly means by it- to my knowledge it is the production and not the consumption of opium in Afghanistan that is the principle concern right now, and suggesting the existence of an “opium culture” clearly bears exotic connotations that have to do with consumption. 
• “Moscow says it still has many friends in the former anti-Taliban Northern Alliance that resisted Talibanization in the northeastern part of the country…” Priceless! To imagine that those among the former anti-Taliban Northern Alliance elements with weaker moral fibers would give in and be Talibanized! This is a prospect that only somebody with the most opaque notion of ethnic relations and political alignments in Afghanistan can contemplate. It is clear that Taliban were primarily Pashtun and aside from the Islamist aspect of their ideology, harbored strong ethno-natioalist sentiments. Suggesting that the Northern Alliance could potentially be Talibanized is absurd.
  
• The author cites the recent CSIS report Breaking Point: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan and although quoting the principal findings of the report verbatim, decides to leave out a crucial qualification in the third and last finding. The original line in the report reads: “Conditions have deteriorated in all key areas targeted for development except for the economy and women’s rights.” With a penchant for hyperboly, the writer scissors the sentence selectively and cuts out the part about improvement of economy and women’s rights. This is intentionally misleading (unlike the other mistakes that are driven more by ignorance.)
• “Volunteers from all over the world have been killed and injured by Taliban guerrillas and pro-Taliban civilians.” I can think of quite a few of my Pashtun compatriots who would boil over in anger with this characterization. Those whom the writer calls “pro-Taliban civilians” responsible for the death of aid workers (and they are hardly volunteers in many cases – most of the time, they are paid quite lavishly by contractors) are Taliban who dissolve into civilian life after the day’s job of being a Talib is over. It is true that civilians in some areas do harbor pro-Taliban sentiments, but I have not heard of mobs of such civilians killing aid workers – and that too on such routine basis as to dissuade them from working. The real work of killing and suicide-bombing and blowing up people and schools is done by bona fide Taliban who when need ariseth, fade into civilian life.
  
• “Meanwhile, Taliban’s much-touted spring offensive is only days away.” Ahh.. the spring offensive! What would western journalist do without this sujet? The notorious spring offensive has kept talking heads and writing hands busy for months to the degree that I seriously think everyone is simply playing into Taliban hands. Also, I did not know that the spring offensive’s date coincided precisely with the new year Nowrouz, now “only days away.” By all accounts, the offensive is not such a precisely scheduled affair and has been underway for weeks now.
• “Democratic judicial structures are also stillborn, stifled by criminal networks and bribes, or camouflaged to practice sharia (Islamic) law.” Shariah law constitutes an important and a constitutional source of law in Afghanistan and hardly needs to be “camouflaged.” That the law be inspired and derived from Shariah was overtly decided and is not a secretive affair. 
• “Mighty Germany won’t let its Afghan contingent do any fighting.” Factually correct – still I found the characterization “Mighty Germany” rather quaint and amusing. 

True, things don’t look their best in Afghanistan, but that should hardly be occasion for journalism to languish accordingly when it comes to writing on Afghanistan. For some time now I have read accounts in papers that have disturbed me in their inaccuracy or for the fact that they have clearly fallen into the political trap of whoever it was that facilitated the journalist’s trip or access to information or translation. This is irresponsible when it comes to the sensitivity of the situation in Afghanistan and the power that the media exerts on opinions and ultimately on decision making in the US, now the largest outside stakeholder in Afghanistan. I hope to muckrake further such eggregious reporting on Afghanistan in the future on Safrang.

Update on New Front + Evolving Hazara Leadership

Here is a bit of correction and an update on the previous post about the formation of the new political front by discontents from among Afghanistan’s old pro-communist and Jihadi figures:

According to Pajhwok Afghan News reports, the front, officially called the “United National Front” does include some “warlord”-designates such as former Herat governor and current Energy minister Ismail Khan, Uzbek strongman and advisor to Karzai on security matters Rashid Dustum, and current speaker of Wulusi Jirga (lower house of Afghan parliament) Yunus Qanooni.

Looking at the updated line-up of faces, it seems that the group takes in just about everyone of significance in Afghan politics who is not already co-opted by the government of president Karzai. Two conspicuous absences from the new front are Sayyaf and Muhaqiq, both with sticky ‘warlord’ epithets, and both powerful current MPs with illustrous Jihad credentials.

What explains these absences?

In the case of Sayyaf, he is already co-opted by the Karzai government and operates in locksteps with the administration, but serves his role more usefully if he is publicly seen as an independent MP.

As for Muhaqiq, well, his political career is in dire straits. He has offered himself many times over to the altar of Karzai, but has no takers. He has shown his willingness to gladly throw his lots with anybody (even bitter former enemies like Sayyaf with a long record of proven and documented atrocities against Muhaqiq’s hazara constituency), and at times, he has sought the graces of the government after being sacked from the cabinet as Karzai’s initial Minister of Planning. Owing to a number of miscalculations (most notably joining forces with Sayyaf in the parliament) Muhaqiq’s popularity among the Hazara people has been sliding.

It is against this backdrop that his absence from the United National Front can be explained: Mustafa Kazemi, the new front’s speaker and an instrumental figure in its founding, is styling himself as the unopposed leader of the “Shi’a” of Afghanistan, a dubious group designation that may work well in Iraq, but is virtually meaningless in Afghanistan. It is clear to one and all that politics in Afghanistan will continue to be driven along ethnic lines and not religious or ideological ones for a long time to come. While Mr. Kazemi is not an ethnic Hazara, he does share the Shi’a persuation of Afghanistan’s third largest ethnic community, and he is planning to capitalize on this common denominator to represent them under a new banner.

From the look of things, and from the record of Mr. Kazemi, he should not have any illusions about the Hazara people rallying to his banner. Not because the Hazara people have better alternatives for leadership (as stated above, both Muhaqiq and Khalili have virtually lost their popular support among the majority of Hazara people), but rather, because in what seems to be an interesting and rare social phenomenon in Afghanistan, the Hazara people as a whole are sliding away from personality-based leadership and what Max Weber would term “traditional” roots of legitimacy in their political thinking. Among the urban-dwelling Hazara for a long time, but increasingly also among other Hazara living in central regions, leadership models of yesteryear are eroding in allure and politics is becoming increasingly “issue-based.”(For statistical data on how political thinking has evolved among the Hazara and the very important role played by civil society groups in shaping this new thinking, refer to the Asia Foundation’s A Survey of the Afghan People 2006.)

Old Guard Lining Up to Form New “National Front”

BBC Persian reporter Dawood Naji writes from Kabul about the formation of a new political front that brings together what would otherwise be an unlikely cohort of yesteryear’s communist party ranking members (Khalqi and Parchami) and their later Jihadi successors.

The list of founding members features a motley crew composed of known faces from both extremes of the ideological spectrum in Afghanistan: deposed defense minister and the inheritor of Shura-y Nizar Marshall Fahim, comrade Gulabzoy (who has since prefixed his name with “Sayed Mohammad”), friend Nurulhaq Ulumi, former president and head of Jamiat-e-Islami Rabbani, and the group’s speaker Mustafa Kazemi with a dubious political pedigree of his own.

“The National Front,” as the group is called, clearly comprises a powerful bloc within both houses of the Afghan parliament. It is clear that the primary raison d’etre for the newfound unity (“brotherhood” or “camaraderie” take your pick) is the simple fact that within the new political configuration in Afghanistan, people of both above stripes see themselves increasingly marginalized.

Interestingly enough, the new grouping has decidedly shut out figures with the indisputable honorific “Warlord” such as Sayyaf, Muhaqiq, Dustum, and a few others. While the latter mostly sport longer beards and tightly wound turbans, and wear their Jihadi pride on their sleeves, Mustafa Kazemi and crew prefer to go with closer trims and more urbane styles. That in itself ought to place them ahead in the game as far as the American powerbrokers are concerned.

The article in BBC Persian also points out that many of the figures in the new line-up of the “National Front” were disgruntled with the results of the constitutional Loya Jirga, and specifically with the strong presidency. To the end they fought for a parliamentary form of government and an office of the Prime Minister and were clearly unhappy when things turned otherwise. When asked whether the new front would struggle for such structural reforms as the shift to a parliamentary form of government, Mustafa Kazemi deferred to the constitution and change that would be consistent with the stipulations of the constitution. His comrades, however, strongly endorsed such structural reforms.

“Reconciliation and Accountability”

“Healing the wounds of the civil war requires both reconciliation and accountability.”

So argue J. Alexander Thier and Scott Worden of USIP in a recent article in CSMonitor.

The authors point out that “although President Hamid Karzai successfully negotiated a crucial amendment to protect the rights of victims of war crimes, the new amnesty law still favors the powerful warlords who sponsored the bill.”

In what seems to be an intentionally vague bit of phrasing, the new bill signed by the president attempts to appease the anxious MPs bent on self-forgiving while at the same time preserving the inalienable rights of the victims:

“The most controversial and confusing aspect of the bill remains its amnesty provisions. On one hand, the revised bill offers general amnesty from prosecution to all former combatants who agree to abide by the Constitution and laws of Afghanistan. However, a crucial clause restricts this reprieve, stating that the amnesty ‘shall not affect individuals’ … criminal or civil claims against persons with respect to individual crimes.’”

Reconciliation and accountability definitely sound great together. Like Khurma and Sawab. Question is, how can both of these be achieved in Afghanistan given the current alignment of powers?

Again the authors:

“The best way to ensure that the new bill becomes a force for reconciliation is to implement it within the framework of the Action Plan for Transitional Justice, enacted by Karzai last December. The plan sets up several mechanisms to foster forgiveness and accountability, such as a commission to vet high-level government officials and a program to build national monuments of remembrance for victims. But crucially, the plan states, ‘[T]here will [not be] amnesty for war crimes, crimes against humanity and other gross human rights violations.’”

However, all indications seem to suggest that what initially catapulted the MPs into a frenzy of action that led to the drawing up of the amnesty bill in the first place was the announcement of the same Action Plan for Transitional Justice enacted by the president (which coincided rather ominously with the trials and executions of Saddam Hussain and his cohorts in Iraq.) It is not entirely clear how the stipulations of the Action Plan can be reconciled with the political contingencies of the day.

Reconciliation or Accountability?

“Reconciliation or accountability?”

It’s one of those choices that in ideality -as opposed to reality- no one should have to make.

Either the one, or the other. Trouble is, both look so damn pretty it’s hard to decide. Like the story of Buridan’s Ass that starved to death unable to decide between the bales of hay.

**

Here are a few other ones like it:

1. “Liberty or security?” (pops up regularly in post-9/11 US – and even in Europe!);

2. “Khurma or Sawab?” (Dari proverb meaning “Dates or deeds?”: otherwordly rewards, or instant gratification);

3. “Peace or justice?” (a common one, most commonly heard in relation to Israeli-Palestinian conflict);

4. “To be or, or not to be: that is the question.” (Shakespeare died trying to figure out what it would be like not to be in order to conclusively answer this.)

**

“Either/Or”

Title of Soren Kierkegaard’s book in which he refutes the either/or paradigm. It is a refutation of the dialectics of Hegel, who famously had an infectious fetish for either/or. The Victorious Hermit’s choice of the title was ironic, and some say even satirical.

**

The short, and correct answer to all of these questions is:

-”Both, please. At the same time.”

**

“Reconciliation or accountability?”

It’s one of those choices that in ideality (as opposed to reality) no one should have to make.

Unfortunately, it’s also a choice that confronts Afghanistan today. In all its harsh reality. And so much depends on it.

**

I understand the warlords – I do- and their ditch effort to just forgive themselves and be all lovey-dovey and peacey-reconciley.

But then what becomes of so much blood spelt, sons murdered, daughters raped, fathers imprisoned and lost, and mothers left alone and sad?

If something is not done about all so much wrong, the sky would -should- fall down. More realistically, the nation’s soul will be so unclean and tainted at the very moment of its new beginning that it will never be cleansed.

With no accountability, there will be no fresh start, no new beginning -of the kind that Afghanistan needs. With no reconciliation, the cycle will just go on.

**

So, reconciliation or accountability?

-”Both, please. At the same time.”

Serendipituous Quotes

At the same time as I was reading Afghanistanica’s latest post where the blogger suggests “if you are a journalist, maybe you should quit writing that Afghans are being angered over a ‘forced imposition’ of women’s rights,” I was listening to a report on PRI’s The World on National Public Radio about women in Afghanistan and how some are “concerned what progress might do to Afghanistan’s culture.”

Perfect.

REPORT: “Breaking Point: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan”

PCR Project commented:

Dear Safrang, Given your interest in Afghanistan, we thought you might be interested in our latest report, Breaking Point: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan. The PCR Project is a part of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think-tank located in Washington, DC. Much more on Afghanistan and Pakistan can be found at www.pcrproject.com.
Best,
PCR Project.

Thanks PCR Project for bringing the omission to my attention. I am remiss not to have posted a link here, especially that I contributed to the report. (Safrang is a pseudonym and no reference to it can be found in the acknowledgements.)

َA summary of the report is available on the PCR Blog, and you can also download the full report there. According to the summary, the report’s key findings are:

• Afghans are losing trust in their government because of an escalation in violence;
• Public expectations are neither being met nor managed;
• Conditions in Afghanistan have deteriorated in all key areas targeted for development, except for the economy and women’s rights.

Of course I am not biased in saying that the report (a follow-up to a baseline report published a year earlier) is one of the most insightful qualitative measures of progress in Afghanistan in recent times, both for its extensive data collection and the unique methodology.

It should be said, however, that the period covered in the report (July 2005 through Oct 2006) leaves out a number of key developments that have happened in the past few months and that could bear heavily on some of the trends captured in the report. The anticipation of these emerging developments makes the report all the more poignant.

Also of note is the telltale title of the report. Last year’s baseline report was titled “In the Balance” – this, at a time when most people had already billed Afghanistan as a success story. That fragile balance was tipped in 2006. This year, the ominous title reads: “Breaking Point”. Judging from the positive reception of the report, it seems that a lot of people are listening.

BOOK: “The Hazara People and Greater Khurasan”

Basir Ahmad Hussainzada reviews M. Taqi Khawari’s new book about the Hazara people for BBC Persian here.

The book, titled The Hazara People and Greater Khurasan seems to be the most comprehensive and serious scholarly study into the origins and the history of the Hazara people since the publication of Dr. Said Askar Mousavi’s The Hazara of Afghanistan a decade ago.

According to the review, in the section dealing with the origins of the Hazara people the author authoritatively rejects the widely held theory that Hazaras are primarily remnants of the marauding hordes (organized into “hazars” or thousands) of Genghis’s Mongol armies. According to the author, a glance into the intra-ethnic diversity within the Hazara people (divided into more than 700 different clans) reveals that not all the Hazaras descend from any single ancestral gene pool.

The books also deals extensively with the waves of Hazara migration out of Afghanistan. According to the sources cited by the author, the westward Hazara mass-migrations into Iran took place in three stages: “during the reign of Nadir Shah Afshar and that of Nasiruddin Shah Qajar, and after the massacres of Hazaras by Abdur Rahman Khan.”

Furthermore, the author gives a detailed account of the prevalence of Shi’a Islam among the Hazara people, who constitute the bulk of Shi’a Muslims in the otherwise Sunni-majority Afghanistan.

As far as one can tell from the review, the author’s research into the Hazara migrations specifically into Iran and their subsequent settlement and acculturation there is groundbreaking. Most of the other topics dealing with the origins and the history of the Hazara people in Afghanistan have been previousely written about.

All the same, the book is a welcome addition to the still sparse scholarship about the Hazara people. In the preface to his own book about the Hazaras of Afghanistan, Dr. Askar Mousavi claims that the Hazara people are the “least well-known ethnic group in Afghanistan.” Although the events of 9/11 and the subsequent US toppling of the Taliban focused the world’s attention on Afghanistan, and more importantly, despite the publication of the bestselling novel The Kiterunner, the Hazara people of Afghanistan remain one of the least known and studied ethnic groups (not that reading The Kiterunner in itself would be of any help in this regard, but the novel was the closest thing to a first encounter for many with the Hazara people.) Serious anthropological and ethnographic studies are particularly rare as most of new research and writing deal with such contemporary interests as their history and politics.

The Hazara People and Greater Khurasan will hopefully be translated into English and read by a wider audience. If in five years it is still not translated, this writer -hopefully out of school by then- will make a serious effort at obtaining the translation rights.

Freedom of the Press in Afghanistan: A Little Bit Pregnant

Says Mr. Saad Mohseni, head of a large media holding company in Afghanistan, in a recent opinion piece published in the Wall Street Journal:

Despite the many challenges facing Afghanistan , the country can boast some major successes and perhaps none is more amazing than the success of its media. In name, at least, we now have a free press.

It certainly is refreshing to learn about “major successes” in Afghanistan. Except… well, what does it exactly mean to have a free press “in name”? That qualifier is a bit puzzling to us. Just to help put things in perspective, would it also be fair to boast of women’s rights in Afghanistan (see previous post), and then add “at least in name”? Ditto a functioning democracy “at least in name”? How does “at least in name” protect journalists from intimidation or women from violence?

Truth is -and somebody else may have already delivered this truth in these colorful terms- that having freedom of press is a bit like pregnancy. You are either pregnant, or you are not -you cannot be a little pregnant; just like you cannot have freedom of the press only in name. The sad reality about freedom of press in Afghanistan is that there just isn’t any, well, except in name.

Nobody knows this more earnestly than Mr. Mohseni whose Tolo TV, among other outlets, has run afoul of the intolerant conservative temperaments many times over its youth-oriented programming. And this is what makes Mr. Mohseni’s praise for freedom of press in Afghanistan a bit disorienting – because he basically uses the rest of the op-ed to chronicle, in such detail as only someone of his level of involvement in the matter can, the many ways in which the gestapoesque Media Monitoring Commission of the Ministry of Information and Culture (which he describes in the op-ed as “the main center of anti-press activity”) attempts to curb and curtail freedom of press and intimidate journalists. The ministry is also the main driving force behind a disturbing piece of legislation (Mr. Mohseni describes it as “draconian”) which is expected to clear both houses of parliament -much like the notorious “amnesty bill” did recently. The legislation is aimed at curbing press freedom under the banner of such disturbingly undefined and vacuous notions as “Islamic values” and “national interests.”

Elsewhere, the ministry has exerted its power through sweeping purges at the government broadcaster RTA (Radio Television Afghanistan) leading to the resignation of its chief Najib Roshan in protest; attempting to limit women’s appearance on television; and summoning a television station owned by Mr. Mohseni’s group specifically for its insufficient censoring of “skin” in its music entertainment programming. Separately, for a couple of weeks the journalist community in Afghanistan was rattled by the surfacing of a certain stern, official-looking document that basically told them not to print any headlines about insurgent attacks on their front pages, and not to undermine national security. And just today, BBC Persian reported that the ministry has ordered the cancellation of an Iranian music band’s performance because the group allegedly insulted Afghanistan’s national anthem and the poet Rumi (Moulana-i Balkh in Afghanistan.)

In a recent Statement Afghanistan’s National Journalists Union (ANJU) accused the Ministry of Information & Culture of attempting to transform the national media “into a propaganda tool in the hands of the executive branch,” and argued that the ministry is over-stepping its limits and acting in direct violation of the Afghan Mass Media Law of 2006. The statement also points out the ministry’s suspension of the Comission for Media Complaints and Violations, forcing journalists to directly refer to the General Attorney for redress of their concerns. The statement concludes by saying that the union is “deeply worried” about the recent measures taken by the ministry, and about the new challenges facing freedom of speech in Afghanistan.

On a related note, the recent news about American soldiers confiscating cameras and threatening photographers in the aftermath of civilian deaths near Jalalabad further undermines the already dismal state of affairs for freedom of press in Afghanistan.

It used to be that on his American trips, whenever asked, Mr. Karzai would affectionately joke about the toughness of the newspapers in Afghanistan on his administration. It turns out he might have just appointed the right person as his Minister of Information & Culture to whip them into line.
—

PS. Word to Freedom House: I cannot, in good conscience, cite your figures for freedom of press in Afghanistan when I know too well that your figures for Afghanistan’s ethnic composition are grossly misleading.

8th March and the State of Afghan Women

On the eve of another International Women’s Day the lot of Afghan women has not improved considerably since the fall of the Taliban. That is the unanimous verdict from the UN, AIHRC (Afghanistan’s Independent Human Rights Commission) and a number of other organizations and reports in the media. Domestic violence, forced marriages, lack of access to health services (and of lesser immediate concern, to education) remain alarmingly high.

According to AIHRC, only in the south-western province of Farah (home to Malalai Joya – vocal woman parliamentarian) self-burning has increased by a whopping 80% over the course of the past year. Other provinces in the same zone have also seen significant rise in self-burning by women victims of domestic violence and forced marriages.

The extreme phenomenon of “burning brides” -as once reported in the West, with flagrant romantic and orientalist overtones- is immensely tragic and existentially fascinating in equal measures; and while we hope the practice itself and the circumstances that lead to it come to an end, it calls for a serious cross-cutting psychological-anthropological-philosophical treatment in the future.

Even with the stigma that is associated with breaching family confidence and reporting abuse, AIHRC documented 1650 cases of violence against women in 2006. The commission also reported 120 cases of death by suicide (self-burning and OD’ing on painkillers) for 2006. No less shocking, IRIN reports that every 30 minutes an Afghan woman dies during childbirth, and the average life expectancy for Afghan women is 44 years. According to UNIFEM (UN Dev. Fund for Women), about 90% of Afghan women are illiterate. (more)

All of this however does not mean that revolutions of a cosmetic nature are not taking place. Afghan women are among the most talked-about women in the world today (right up there with Paris Hilton and Britney Spears), and the focus of a global circle of bleeding-heart sympathy that translates to photo-ops, quick-fix projects, conferences, and start-up non-profits. Yesterday, two Kabul newspapers’ editorials duly blasted these as mere talk and repetitious stage shows that do very little to tangibly change the status of women of Afghanistan. (The dailies are Wisa and Anis – at least once of which primarily targets a women readership)

To mark the occassion the US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice awarded “International Women of Courage” awards to a group of women from around the world that included two women from Afghanistan; the Canadian Governor-General made a surprise visit to Afghanistan; UNDP announced a $10 million grant to Afghanistan’s Ministry of Women’s Affairs over the next two years; and Afghanistan’s Supreme Court and the aid group Medica Mondiale announced a joint initiative to register marriages in an effort to cut down on forced marriages. Pojhwak news also reported the opening of a small hospital in Kabul for women narcotics addicts.

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[See related post on Safrang: The Abominable Everywomen]

“Silent Death in Central Afghanistan”

The daily Iqtidar-e-Milli in Kabul carried the above headline today, writing about areas in central Afghanistan that are virtually cut off from the outside world due to heavy snowfall. The newspaper laments the fact that more than five years after the process of reconstruction has began in Afghanistan, in certain parts of the country things have not changed at all. According to the report, lack of access to such basic needs as “health facilities, roads, and safe drinking water” has frustrated the local population and is eroding their faith in the new government.

Time to think seriously about the Kabul-Bamiyan-Cheghcharan-Herat highway? If and when completed by a confluence of miracles, unlikely political will, and generous international aid, the project is bound to lift the standard of living in much of central Afghanistan including Hazarajat from stone age levels, and cut down on precious east-west transit time that otherwise has to skirt around the country.

Separately, BBC reports casualties due to heavy snowfall in Western province of Herat. Even prayers are answered with a twist here.

Opium Production Through the Roof – Again

One wonders whether the recent changes in US drug policy towards Afghanistan were in anticipation of this: the fact that for the second year in a row, opium production levels have reached new heights.

In the months leading up to this announcement by the US Department of State, the said agency announced the appointment of William B. Wood, formerly ambassador to the drug-ridden Colombia, as its new ambassador in Kabul. Separately, US government pressure increased on the GoA to allow invasive eradication procedures, which formerly took a backseat to interdiction efforts. At least one other senior US government official spoke of Colombia’s success in the fight against drugs as a model for Afghanistan.

Whether those changes were anticipating the new revelations or not, the fact remains that the fight against drugs in Afghanistan has been a dismal failure ever since day one of post-Taliban Afghanistan. In fact, Taliban had greater success in curbing poppy cultivation (albeit for other motives.)

The new announcement, however, comes with a bit of a good news caveat from the UN:

The UN says although production of poppies, used to make heroin, has fallen in the north and centre, a sharp rise is likely in the lawless south. (more from BBC)

I do know of Badakhshan having become a drug-infested province lately, but did not know of any provinces in the center with notable poppy cultivation. If the UN means Uruzgan, for all but geographical reasons that province is a southern one.

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Unrelated, ُSafrang is delighted by the newcomer on the block: Afghanistanica – an exploration of Afghanistan from a safe distance. Afghanistanica features some of the best written and best-backed-up blogging on Afghanistan you will see anywhere -and not only online backlinks. We only wish the blogger had activated commenting.

Cover Ups and Collateral Damage

A few months ago president Karzai wept in public while talking about Afghans’ helplessness as they are attacked by the Taliban on the one hand, and the foreign troops on the other. Whether staged or genuine (we tend to think it was genuine) the emotional episode epitomized the weariness of those civilians who found themselves sandwiched between two blind forces.

That was then, in the aftermath of another incident with heavy civilian losses of life.

On March 4-5th, in a span of less than 24 hours, two more such incidents took place in Afghanistan. The first happened when a US troops convoy was attacked by a car bomb near Jalalabad, and subsequently started shooting at passers-by as it sped away. US army sources later confirmed that 8 civilians were killed and 35 more injured. Later, in a night-time artillary attack and air strike in Kapisa province, 9 more civilians were killed as 2000lb bombs were dropped on a house.

In a reminder of last spring’s demonstrations -following a similar convoy incident north of Kabul in which civilian bystanders were killed- after the Jalalabad highway incident thousands of people took to the streets protesting civilian deaths and shouting slogans against the foreign troops and the central government. In retrospect, observers see last spring’s protests as a milestone in post-Taliban Afghanistan, as they marked the beginning of a downward trajectory which lasted for the rest of the year 2006, and is yet to be turned about.

Whether the recent episode proves to be another steep drop in that downward trajectory remains to be seen. However, the involved troops’ response in the immediate aftermath of the civilian deaths is not anything to be too hopeful about. Most disturbingly, US soldiers on the scene confiscated cameras and deleted journalists’ photographs of civilian cars sprayed with bullets, threatening to also “delete” a journalist if he did not comply. Furthermore, the US military’s attempt to explain away the incident as some sort of a “complex ambush” does not seem either ingenuous or convincing, and should be independently confirmed through an investigation. President Karzai has called for just such an investigation, a call which the Human Rights Watch has strongly endorsed.

It seems that the US army has taken to heart the lessons of history as they pertain to a certain aspect of such incidents: that images have the power to win or lose wars: Vietnam. Mai Lai. Abu Ghraib. Iraq. But the lesson is only half learnt. The other half goes something like this: cover-ups usually end up doing more damage than damage control. The best way to deal with these tragic incidents is to confront them in their full ugliness. Just as with persons, so too with wars secrets have a habit of piling up on each other so that soon the whole effort seems like a sinister, secretive undertaking. And then the war is lost.

Tragic and heart rending as the episode was, the way that the US army dealt with Abu Ghraib probably came closest to the best way of dealing with something that difficult. Granted that many were forced to confront the truth -as by that time the images were already public- the fact that those responsible were held accountable, and the ugliness of the incident was publicly acknowledged, and decried, helped to distance it from the wider effort that is the war itself. Had they been swept under the rug, to date they would haunt all those who were involved, or knew about it, and did not do anything -needless to mention how the Iraqis themselves felt about it.

With civilian losses of life becoming so frequent in Afghanistan, it is time to ask why. When accidents become routine, then something is really wrong. Cover ups and information control may hide the symptoms, they may delay the inevitable, but they do not address the sources of the problem. The inevitable is that the sources of problem -which could, for all we know, be of a systematic nature- should be confronted soon.

The US army has said time and again that it is fighting an unconventional war with an unconventional adversary. Part of what that means is that the adversary -an irregular guerilla force- is not under the same international treaty obligations that the US army is -that is, among others, to ensure civilians’ safety. Unless measures are taken to prevent such episodes from happening again -and a good place to start doing that is to find out why they happened in the past- it seems only certain the war will be lost one incident at a time, and in the process, also bereft of its legitimacy.